even if so requested by the party in favour of which the decision has been rendered. However difficult it would be for a constitutional lawyer to come to terms with the idea that on the domestic plane the Judiciary might be in a position of dependence upon the Executive in such substantive terms, it cannot be denied that the above picture should not appear as particularly shocking to a United Nations student. One should not lose sight of the fact that the Security Council is, at the same time, both the supreme political organ of the Organization and, virtually, the only institutional means for enforcement in the UN system, and that it is also vested with powers to promote peaceful settlement of disputes under Chapter VI of the Charter. It is as well to bear in mind that realistically the wording of Article 94(2), in its final version, is totally in line with the political underpinnings of the overall structure of the UN Charter, i.e. a construction centred on the pillar of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council. It would have been surprising, however desirable in principle, if a Charter provision were to provide an absolute obligation for the Council to act in order to give effect to a Court decision. Difficulties would arise with respect to such a provision with regard to the possibility -also inevitable under the present Charter -that the political evaluations of the Council on a given case might differ from the stand taken by the Court on the basis of purely legal reasoning. Such difficulties would become only more apparent in a situation where the Council found itself compelled to pass ex-officio a resolution against a Permanent Member which had lost a case before the Court and did not intend to comply with its ruling. This consideration will also be relevant later on, when dealing with the voting procedure applicable to a draft resolution based on Article 94(2).
A. Are Political Organs of the UN Vested with the Power to 'Review' a Decision of the Court?
The Security Council
In studying Article 94(2), the question has also been raised whether the Council is vested with some power to review decisions of the Court. 10 No power of revision over pronouncements of the Court is expressly provided for the Council anywhere in the Charter. The rationale of Article 94 is certainly not that of providing the Security Council with the power to decide on the validity of a Court decision. On the contrary, Article 60 of the Statute of the Court, which forms an integral part of the Charter, provides that '[t] he judgment is final and without appeal', and Article 61 confers upon the Court exclusive competence over any dispute 'as to the meaning and scope of the judgment', as well as over proceedings for its revision. In addition, the latter provision makes application for revision conditional upon discovery of a new fact unknown to the Court at the time when it 10 Kelsen, "The Settlement of Disputes by the Security Council', The int. V Law Quart. (1948) Problems of Enforcement of Decisions of the ICJ and the Law of the United Nations handed down the judgment.' l The contention could be made, though, that these statutory rules on revision are totally irrelevant to the question in point, which does not refer to the power of revision of a judgment in technical terms, but, instead, from a primarily political point of view. Therefore, the issue should be analysed having regard to the powers of the Council to discuss and to deliberate on any dispute, or situation, of the nature referred to in Articles 34 or 39 of the Charter generally, or in 94(2) in particular. Under such terms, it seems difficult to rule out, in principle, that the Council may act in conformity with the Charter in such a way that could amount to a political revision of a Court decision.
When a State has recourse to the Security Council under Article 94(2), a debate normally ensues in which it is highly likely that arguments will be put forward, at least by the defaulting State, that will question the validity of the Court's decision, either on the merits of the case, or on the Court's jurisdiction, which must also be decided upon by the Court itself, according to Article 36(6) of its Statute.
12 Such a debate could in itself provide an element of political revision of the Court's decision. The strength of such a revisionary debate would be proportional to the force of the arguments put forward to contest the decision and, especially, to the number of Members of the Council that subscribe to them. Such a form of political revision would be formally sanctioned -in total conformity with the discretionary character of the powers of the Security Council under Article 94(2) -if a draft resolution, introduced under this provision and containing a recommendation, or measures, to give effect to the judgment, were not adopted through lack of the necessary majority. 13 The first two instances in which Article 94(2) was invoked before the Security Council -in 1951 by the United Kingdom against Iran in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case, and in 1986 by Nicaragua in the well-known case against the United Statescorroborate the assumption that the scenario above depicted might well occur in practice.
As regards the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case, its main relevance here lies in the fact that it referred to an order of the Court requiring provisional measures, whereas Article 94 refers, in paragraph 1, to decisions, and, in paragraph 2, to judgments. The question of the scope of application of the provision at hand with respect to Court orders will be considered later on in this paper; but what is of special relevance for us at this juncture is the fact that, as a result of the UK having 11 It is noteworthy that paragraph 3 of Article 61 also provides that '[t] he Court may require previous compliance with the terms of the judgment before it admits proceedings in revision '. 12 Obviously, one is not suggesting that Article 94(2) applies to decisions of the Court as to its jurisdiction.
13
The case has also been made (it would certainly be a border-line case) that the Council might deliberate to the effect that the decision of the Court should not be given immediate effect. One cannot but subscribe to the argument that the only way to reconcile such a deliberation with Article 76 of the Rules of Court, according to which the judgment becomes binding on the parties as of the day on which it is read in open Court, is to consider that"... [t] his type of moratorium [...] would not undermine the authority of the Court but simply suspend the obligatory force of the judgment on the ground that new proceedings have intervened' (Schachter, supra note 3,-at 22).
Attila Tanzi proposed under Article 94(2) that the Security Council call upon Iran to comply with a pronouncement of the Court, 14 a debate followed in which arguments similar to those submitted to the Court by the parties were taken up by Members of the Council, 15 and the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom 16 and repeatedly revised, was eventually withdrawn. 17 The Case of the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua may be regarded as another example in which recourse to the Security Council under Article 94(2) could be seen as a threat to the legal authority of the judicial decisions of the Court, due to the lack of action by the Council.
Widi a letter dated 17 October 1986 the Permanent Representative of Nicaragua to the United Nations requested an emergency meeting of the Security Council 'in accordance with the provisions of Article 94 of the Charter, to consider the noncompliance with the Judgment of the International Court of Justice dated 27 June 1986 [...] . ' 18 Pursuant to that request a meeting of the Council was held a few days later 19 during which a draft resolution was introduced that'... Iran objected to the validity of the Court's order on the basis that the Court was not competent in the case by virtue of Articles 1 (2) and 2(7) of the Charter (UNSCOR, 6th Yr, 560th mtg, paras. 28-39 and 43-67). For his part, the representative of the former Yugoslavia, siding with Iran, argued that the Security Council was not bound by decisions taken by another organ of the United Nations (UNSCOR, 6th Yr, 559th mtg, at 3). See also the stand taken by India, according to which it was not proper for the Council to pronounce on the question of jurisdiction when it had not been decided by the Court (ibid., paras. 69-76). It is to be noted that the two sets of arguments presented before the Council, those in favour and those against the Court's competence, reproduced much the same issue that was pending before the Court, and were meant to be formalized in a Council resolution. A draft to that effect had been introduced by Ecuador. In its first preambular paragraph, it referred to the statements made in the Council by the parties to the dispute before the Court, and in its operative part it advised the parties to try again to settle their dispute, without even mentioning the preventive measures contained in the Court's Order (UNSCOR, 6th Yr. 562nd mtg., para. 48, S/2380).
16
Ibid., at 2 and 3 (S/2358).
17
Given the special circumstances of the case, it can be regarded as a precedent in which the Security Council solved by way of self-restraint, a typical case of 'litispendence' between itself and the Court. In fact, at the time when the Council was debating the issue, the same case was pending before the Court which, after having indicated interim measures, had still to pass judgment on its own jurisdiction. Since the proposal by the UK on the question of non-compliance by Iran with the Court's order, was not gaining ground in the Council, and in consideration that in debating such a question a number of issues were being discussed which were still pending before the Court, as they basically pertained to its jurisdiction, the view prevailed that the Problems of Enforcement of Decisions of the ICJ and the Law of the United Nations a Permanent Member, i.e., the United States. 21 This negative result was, though, formally reached through a debate which substantially upheld, or, at least, did not aim to undermine the authority of the Court. The United States, i.e., the defaulting party, was the only Member that put forward arguments against the validity of the judgment of the Court arguing that the latter had passed a decision that it 'had neither the jurisdiction nor the competence to render'. 22 The United States was also the only Member that voted against the draft resolution. It is noteworthy that Honduras, admitted to the debate under Article 31 of the Charter, aside from blaming Nicaragua for having made 'use of the Court for propagandists purposes', did not touch upon the Court's findings either as to its jurisdiction, or on the substantive merits of the case.
23 Also those Members of the Council who did not support the draft resolution and, therefore, abstained, namely, France, Thailand and the United Kingdom, did not object to the validity of the Court's pronouncement. It was made clear by those delegations that their stand on the matter was based on purely political considerations regarding the implications of the Court's decision, rather than on legal grounds concerning its validity.
24
After the above-mentioned draft resolution was vetoed in the Security Council, an identical text was submitted by Nicaragua to the General Assembly. 
The General Assembly
As a result of Nicaragua's initiative to transfer the debate from the Security Council to the General Assembly, the question turns on the competence of the latter over issues of non-compliance with decisions of the International Court of Justice. Unlike the Security Council, the General Assembly is not specifically vested with a similar competence. However, one should not deduce from this that the Charter rules out such a competence. 26 No arguments a contrariis based upon Article 94(2) can defeat the general scope of the functions and powers of the Assembly entrusted to it by Article 10, and stressed in Article 11(4) of the Charter. Limitations to the general competence of the Assembly have been expressly provided in Articles 11(2) and 12(1). According to these provisions, the General Assembly cannot lawfully deal with a dispute over non-compliance with a Court decision while the issue is pending before the Council, nor can it decide that action should be taken with respect to such a dispute.
27
In line with the above reasoning, and in consideration of the fact that the draft resolution introduced by Nicaragua did not provide for any enforcement measures of the kind provided for in Chapter VII, the draft resolution was discussed and put to the vote in the General Assembly. It was adopted by ninety-four votes to three (El Salvador, Israel and the United States voting against), with forty-seven Problems of Enforcement of Decisions of the ICJ and the Law of the United Nations abstentions. 28 In the debate that preceded and followed the vote the Court's authority was, basically, left intact, apart from the United States' reiteration of the arguments put forward in the Council against the Court's assertion of jurisdiction.
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The Representative of El Salvador, who, together with those of Israel and the United States, had voted against the resolution, focused his objection on the content of the draft resolution itself rather than on the Court's decision, and refuted the political usefulness of the latter vis-a-vis the then ongoing peace process in Central America. 30 The Representative of Ecuador explained his affirmative vote, even though his delegation was against 'the eminently political implications' of the resolution, by stressing Ecuador's 'unswerving respect for the legal and peaceful means provided by international law for the consideration and the settlement of disputes, one of the most effective ways of which is resort to the International Court of Justice and full respect for the Court's judgments.'
31 By the same token, the Representative of Luxembourg explained that his delegation 'did not vote against the draft resolution because it recognizefd] the validity of the judgments of the International Court of Justice' even if it disagreed as to its appropriateness with respect to the general political situation in Central America. 32 Mexico's stand is particularly relevant for our purposes insofar as its Representative maintained that compliance with Court's judgments should always be supported 'regardless of any particular position taken on the substance of the issue that led to the litigation'. 
Some Tentative Conclusions
As regards the general question of whether United Nations political organs are vested with the power to 'review' a Court decision, given that the Charter neither expressly provides, nor excludes, such a power, discussion of the matter must be based on practice, however scarce, as much as on principle. According to a textual interpretation of the Charter, both the Security Council, under Article 94(2), Chapters VI and VII, and the General Assembly, under Article 10 and Chapter VI, can discuss and make recommendations on the merits of a case decided upon by the Court in a way which might be somehow at variance with the Court's decision. However, one cannot but agree that'... [t] This view seems to be in line with the position taken by Member States in the few instances in which the question in point has presented itself. Particularly, in the course of the debate over the Court's decision in the Nicaragua case in the Security Council, as well as in the General Assembly, the prevailing attitude of Member States has been one of either total support for the Court's authority, or of selfrestraint, with the exception of those States adversely affected by the decision. A policy of self-restraint also seems to have been followed, after all, by the Council and its Members in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case. The lack of action by the Council in that case was aimed at preventing support for the provisional measures originally indicated by the Court later proving to be in conflict with the Court's judgment on its jurisdiction. Support, by analogy, for the assumption that the Council, and, even more so, the Assembly, should not review the validity of a decision of the Court has been found in the position taken repeatedly by Member States in the General Assembly with regard to advisory opinions of the Court. 35 The general view expressed by Member States is that advisory opinions should be accepted by the Assembly, or, possibly, even refused upon political considerations, without discussion of the findings of the Court. 36 One of the most indicative statements to that effect is that of the United States Representative on the advisory opinion on Certain Expenses of the United Nations: This policy of self-restraint on the part of UN political organs and its Members would not consist only of avoiding action that might be in contrast with a ruling of the Court, the UN political body could also be said to have followed a satisfactory policy of self-restraint when, in the particular circumstances, it did not follow up the request by the successful litigant, or deliberated in such a way that might not reflect the decision of the Court, provided this was based on merely political grounds and without touching upon the legal reasoning of the Court. 38 The basic justification, from both a legal and a political point of view, for the Council to take a stand, based upon political considerations, in conflict with the decision of the Court would rest on the generally agreed principle that the dispute decided by the Court should be considered as separate from the one arising out of the non-compliance with the Court's decision.
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The conclusion that an attitude of self-restraint by UN political organs and its
Members would be the only realistic way to preserve the authority of the Court in the matter at hand could be implemented by a rule of conduct. Such a rule, unsuitable by its nature for insertion in the Charter by way of a formal amendment, could be 'codified' by a General Assembly resolution 40 -and, possibly, also, by a 37 US Del. to UN General, Press Release No. 4112 (1962) 3, summarized in UN GAOR, 17th sess., 5th Comm., at 277 et seq. (A/C.5/SR.961). See also the statement made by the Representative of the United Kingdom in the same debate, UN GAOR, 17th sess., 5th Comm., at 282 (A/C.5/SR.962). 38
As Schachter put it, '... [i]t [the Security Council] will, in short, be neither a sheriff nor an appellate tribunal, but a political body competent to take account of the widest range of considerations that may be involved in determining whether, and to what extent, the coercion of the international community shall be brought to bear upon the recalcitrant State' (supra note 3, at 21). 39 'En droit international, la separation du prononce de l'arret et de sa mise en vigueur est un postulat essentiel tant dans le domaine de 1'arbitrage que dans celui du reglement judiciaire' and added that 'la Charte aussi bien que le Pacte avant elle-meme, sont bas£s sur la presomption que la procedure de mise en vigueur, si elle est ported devant 1'organe politique competent, acquiert le charactere d'un differend entierement nouveau qu'il convient de r£gler par des moyens politiques, ou la sentence arbitrale ou judiciaire n'est elle-meme qu'un seul parmi plusieurs facteurs' (Rosenne, supra note 3, at 534, 535). 40
We are referring to the kind of General Assembly resolutions that have been the result of the work of the Assembly's 'Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Organization'. Such non-binding instruments were aimed, in some cases, at confirming the evolutive practice of UN organs, in other cases, at maximising the application of existing Charter provisions in the field of peaceful settlement of disputes and maintenance of international peace and security. Reference should be made, in particular, to Resolution 37/10 of 15 November 1982 on 'Peaceful Settlement of Disputes', also known as the 'Manila Declaration'; Security Council resolution with the same content and the same hortatory effect. Obviously, one would not think of a resolution exclusively devoted to the question in point. The suggestion could be more appropriately discussed in the context of a resolution of wider scope, such as the enhancement of the role of the International Court of Justice. A similar initiative could fit well within the current United Nations Decade on International Law and might represent a consistent development of the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes.
HI. Voting Procedure in the Security Council When it Acts under Article 94(2) of the Charter
As is well known, voting procedure in the Security Council was one of the most debated issues at the San Francisco Conference, 41 and has been one of the most politically controversial ever after.
42 With regard to the so called 'veto power', as early as 1953 McDougal referred to Article 27 as an example of 'normative ambiguity with respect to rules created by agreement'.
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Among the several problems concerning the application of Article 27 of the Charter, one is voting in the Council on a draft resolution introduced under Article 94(2). The problem is twofold. First, an assessment must be made as to whether the question of non-compliance with a Court decision amounts to a procedural matter under Article 27(2). If so, no Permanent Member of the Council may exercise its veto power, nine unqualified votes being sufficient for the adoption of the draft resolution. Second, in the case of a negative answer to the above query, the question arises whether a Member of the Council who was a party in the litigation before the Court should abstain under Article 27(3). Both arguments, clearly incompatible with each other, were put forward by Nicaragua after the above mentioned request to the Council to call for compliance with the Court's judgment of 27 June 1986 was not Problems of Enforcement of Decisions of the ICJ and the Law of the United Nations considered as adopted on account of the contrary vote of the United States. 44 They deserve further thought and consideration particularly in view of the likelihood that situations similar to the Nicaragua case will present themselves before the Council in future.
A. The Alleged Procedural Character of a Resolution Under Article 94(2)
The argument that a Council resolution to give effect to a Court judgment is to be considered as a decision on a procedural matter under Article 27(2) was based upon General Assembly Resolution 267(111) of 14 April 1949. 45 This resolution indicated a list of issues to be treated as procedural for the purpose of voting in die Council. The list included '[decisions to remind members of their obligations under the Charter'. This argument must have sounded effective from a political view point when it was put forward by Nicaragua after the United States had cast its veto against the adoption of a resolution calling them to abide by the judgment. Indeed, as it appears from the preparatory works of the said General Assembly Resolution, 46 its rationale was precisely to stress the need that the Permanent Members of the Council should not defeat the purpose of the Charter and its obligations through the exercise of die veto.
From a strictly legal point of view, however, the above argument is hardly convincing. 47 First and foremost, a General Assembly resolution cannot possibly bind die Security Council, particularly on a question of fundamental importance such as voting. According to Article 10 of the Charter, the Assembly may make recommendations to the Council, even relating to its powers and functions. By definition, however, recommendations are not legally binding per se, and it is undiinkable that a General Assembly resolution could modify the voting procedures of the Council as determined in Article 27, unless within the framework of the procedure for amending the Charter provided for in Article 108. It is also to be noted that, in keeping with the principle that each UN organ is the master of its own procedure, in 1946 the Council adopted its Rules of Procedure 48 which, as of its 50 The argument could be put forward that this resolution might be regarded as a form of interpretation of the Charter, but, even as such, it cannot be considered as binding, as there is no indication in the Charter, nor in the preparatory works at San Francisco, that the General Assembly was granted a legally-binding supreme competence to interpret the constitutive Treaty of the Organization. 51 Finally, the contention could also be made that, in the very case in which the above argument was raised by Nicaragua, it could not apply. In fact, draft Resolution S/18428 in its operative part did not generally remind Member States of their obligation to abide by decisions of the International Court of Justice under Article 94(1) of the Charter, but called for full and immediate compliance with a specific judgment of the Court. The argument that, when the Council votes on a resolution under Article 94(2), a party to the dispute which was decided upon by the Court should abstain according to Article 27(3) lends itself to more problematic considerations, if only because, if accepted, it should also bind Permanent Members of the Council. On the face of it, according to a textual interpretation of the Charter, this argument seems utterly untenable. In fact, according to Article 27(3) a Member of the Council which is also 
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a party to a dispute should abstain from voting on a resolution which refers to the said dispute only when the resolution is based on Chapter VI, whereas Article 94 belongs to Chapter XIV. This reasoning must have been implicitly followed in the Nicaragua case, when the President of the Council did not consider draft Resolution S/18428 as adopted, due to the veto cast by the United States. On the other hand, it is as well to bear in mind that the subject in point prompted widely differing opinions in the past -before the Nicaragua case. 53 Furthermore, the said ruling of the President of the Council cannot be taken to reflect a consolidated practice, as it constitutes the only specific precedent. A special precedent, since the party to the dispute before the Court was a Permanent Member of the Council, and one which did not pass undisputed.
54 Therefore, the textual interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Charter referred to above might not be the only one apt to provide a tenable solution to the problem at hand.
A Functional Interpretation of Article 94(2)
One might argue that Article 94(2) adds nothing to the powers 'to make recommendations or to decide measures' that are conferred to the Council under Chapters VI and VII of the Charter, with special regard to Articles 36, 37, 41 and 42. This argument rests on the absolute discretion given by Article 94(2) to the Council, discussed above, 55 as well as on the absence, in the same provision of any indication of substance as to the specific kind of measures the Council could recommend or decide to take, if asked to give effect to a decision of the Court.
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In According to this argument, the voting procedure that applies when the Council deliberates under Article 94(2) cannot be determined on principle, once and for all. Rather, such a determination should be made on a case-by-case basis, having regard to the content of the operative part of a given draft resolution, in order to assess whether the latter falls within the framework of Chapter VI or VII. This conclusion would apply even if one considered Article 94(2) as an independent legal basis for the Council to recommend or take measures of the kind indicated in Chapter VII, irrespective of 'the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression' under Article 39. 56 In this case, the same voting procedure that applies when voting on a draft resolution under Chapter VII should apply by analogy.
It has been maintained that '[t] he Council may proceed to call upon the country concerned to carry out the judgment, but only if the peace of the world is threatened, and if the Council has made determination to that effect'.
57 With respect to similar assumptions, Schachter has rightly pointed out the absence of 'reasons of policy or general principle to justify such restriction'. 58 He went on to say that:
...
[I]f it should be necessary that there be a threat to the peace before the successful party can obtain the assistance of the Council, there would evidently be a direct incentive for Problems of Enforcement of Decisions of the ICJ and the Law of the United Nations that state to claim that it may be compelled to resort to force or other acts endangering international peace -a consequence which was almost surely not intended and which cannot be considered as desirable.59
There are, indeed, no indications in the preparatory works of the Charter that the drafters envisaged Article 94(2) exclusively as a specific case of application of Chapter VII. During the San Francisco Conference, the delegation of Bolivia had proposed the inclusion in the Charter of a non-exhaustive list of situations to be considered as cases of aggression, 60 and according to this proposal, a State party to a case before the Court which did not comply with its decision should be considered as an aggressor State. 61 This proposal met with the opposition of a considerable number of delegations and, eventually, was not adopted. 62 This refusal was certainly due to a widespread disinclination among delegations at San Francisco to have a list of cases of aggression, as this would restrict considerably the margins of discretion of the Council in the assessment of the preconditions for it to take enforcement action under Chapter VII. Though, this refusal can also be attributed to an objection to the very idea that non-compliance with a Court decision could be considered to amount to a threat to, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.
63 Furthermore, one should not overlook the fact that non-compliance with a Court decision does not appear among the cases of aggression listed in the General Assembly Declaration on the Definition of Aggression of 14 December 1974. 64 In principle, the powers of the Security Council regarding non-compliance with the obligations stemming from a decision of the International Court of Justice should fall primarily within the ambit of its functions in the field of the peaceful settlement of disputes, under Chapter VI.
65 Therefore, it should make little difference whether, in a case of non-compliance with a Court decision, the Council is convened under Article 94(2), or under Article 35(1), according to which '... [a] 67 The Nicaragua precedent itself, apart from the ruling of the President of the Council under consideration, did not provide any further clear answers to the issue at hand, for draft Resolution S/18428 did not state in its preamble on which Charter provision it was based, whereas, in its operative part it confined itself to calling for compliance with the Court's Judgment 'in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Charter'.
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When we come to the operative stage, Article 94(2) provides that the Council may 'make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment'. In line with the assumption put forward above, the most appropriate tool for the Council to deal with a case of non-compliance with a Court decision, which is deemed to constitute a 'situation which might lead to international friction', according to Article 34, would be a recommendation under Articles 36 and, or, 37. 69 As to the voting on such a resolution, which would be based on Chapter VI, Article 27(3) should apply; accordingly, a State Member of the Council who is a party to the case should abstain. The above should be without prejudice to the Council dealing with a case of non-compliance within the framework of Chapter VII. This shift from Chapter VI to VII would depend, in principle, on the determination by the Council that a given case of non-compliance amounts to a threat to or breach of the peace, or an act of aggression under Article 39. The contention has been made that 67 UNSCOR, 6th Yr., 559th mtg., paras. 71 but one cannot agree with it with regard to the case in which the Council decided that some concrete enforcement measures were to be taken. In this case, the obligations deriving from the Court's decision -for the parties only -would be complemented by those, binding upon all the Members of the Organization, providing for the adoption of a given conduct vis-a-vis the defaulting State with a view to coercing the latter to comply with the decision. Obviously, the procedure under Article 27(3) would apply when voting on such a draft resolution to the effect that a Member of the Council which is a party to the dispute is not under an obligation to abstain. Consequently, a Permanent Member of the Council who happened to be the defaulting party could legitimately cast its veto on a similar draft resolution.
An interpretation of Article 94(2) has also been advanced to the effect that this provision could also constitute an independent legal ground for the Council to take coercive measures of the kind under Chapter VII, irrespective of the preconditions provided for in Article 39. 72 One can certainly subscribe, in principle, to this assumption with respect to enforcement measures not involving the use of armed force. Since Article 41 indicates a non-exhaustive list of possible measures, one can hardly think of measures that the Council could take under Article 94(2) that it could not adopt also under Article 41. Given the obligatory character that such a decision would derive from Article 25, then by analogy, the veto power of the Permanent Members of the Council should apply as if the decision were adopted under Chapter VII. The considerations developed so far on voting on a draft resolution under Article 94(2), with special regard to the duty of abstention for the parties to a dispute, have been made on the basis of a textual interpretation of Article 27(3). However, even if this is not the appropriate place to delve into this issue, one cannot overlook the fact that the relevant practice shows that in the great majority of instances when Article 27(3) should have applied this has not been the case.
73 That is to say that first, never has the Council rejected the claim to a vote, and that it be counted, made by one of its Members who was a party to a dispute. Besides, never, in such a case, have the Permanent Members of the Council refrained from using the veto. 74 In the few instances in which Members of the Council who were parties to a dispute have abstained from voting on a draft resolution referring to such a dispute, they have done so expressly indicating that their conduct was not to be considered as an application of Article 27(3). 75 In the only case when the provision at hand has been applied, the Eichmann case, the abstaining Member was not a Permanent Member and its vote would not have affected in any way the final result of the vote. 76 On account of the above, the question has been rightly raised whether the duty to abstain under Article 27(3) has not become obsolete, or, abrogated by subsequent practice. 
A Tentative Assessment of the Precedent in the Nicaragua Case
As already indicated, draft Resolution S/18428 contains no express reference to any Charter provision as its legal basis. The main purpose of the draft resolution was to request the defaulting party to abide by the Court's Judgment. While the Security Council can only decide measures exclusively under Chapter VII, it can make recommendations either under Chapter VI, or under Chapter VII. Even if one were to regard Article 94(2) as an independent source of power, for the purposes of assessing the applicable voting procedure in the Council, an Article 94 (2) 
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(b) by determining whether in its preamble there is any language that describes the situation it refers to as a threat to, or a breach of, the peace; (c) subsidiarily, by making an objective assessment of the situation referred to in the resolution. Since the draft resolution in point does not offer any indication of the kind referred to above under (a) or (b), one has to rely on an evaluation of the objective situation, or dispute, created by the failure on the part of the United States to comply with the Court's Judgment. Such an evaluation, in order to be complete, would require a series of factual and political assessments that go beyond the scope of the present study. Therefore, we shall confine ourselves to some general considerations of a legal character.
Following the above described reasoning, the contention might be made that draft Resolution S/18428, calling for immediate compliance with the Judgment of the Court in the Nicaragua case, should not necessarily have been placed within the framework of Chapter VII only because the dispute decided upon by the Court was one that involved the use of armed force and, therefore, unquestionably, constituted a threat to, or a breach of, the peace under Chapter VII. As already emphasized, 79 the dispute arising out of non-compliance with a judgment should have been considered as separate from the one which was before the Court. This argument was also put forward during the debate in the Council on the case in point. Namely, the representative of Syria stated the following:
While it is true that today's complaint has been presented by the Government of Nicaragua against the United States, this complaint is not really confined to the conflict between the United States and Nicaragua. In actual fact this complaint relates to the obligation on the part of Member States to abide by the judgments of the highest international judicial authority, that is the International Court of Justice. 80 However, one cannot automatically exclude, just on the strength of this argument, that the dispute, or situation, deriving from the non-compliance with the Court's decision in this particular case, as well as in similar cases which could arise.in future, might in itself amount to a threat to, or a breach of, the peace. 81 The Court in its Judgment of 27 June 1986 had found the United States responsible for continuing conduct in breach of a number of international obligations, clearly aimed at protecting international peace. 82 The fact that the United States did not comply with the 'duty' decided by the Court 'immediately to cease and to refrain from all such acts as may constitute breaches of the foregoing legal obligations', 83 could just as well have been considered in itself as a continuing breach of the peace. Ironical as it may seem, this interpretation would benefit the position of the United States in the Council, placing the subject-matter of the relevant draft resolution within Chapter VII, and, therefore, legitimizing its veto.
If, on the other hand, one were to give prevalence to the interpretation according to which the resolution in point fell under Chapter VI, and on the assumption that the obligation to abstain in Article 27(3) was still in force, the ruling of the President who counted the negative vote of'the United States, should be considered illegal. Lacking a system of judicial review of the activity of United Nations organs, it is basically the attitude of Member States, with their express acceptance or acquiescence, that can legitimate ex post, and on an ad hoc basis, a ruling at variance with the Charter. 84 It is certainly easier to speculate as to the legal effects of a resolution allegedly wrongfully adopted, than the possibly illegal non-adoption of a draft resolution. However, it is to be noted that during the debate in the Council immediately following the above ruling, the legality of the non-adoption was not contested, except by the directly interested State, namely Nicaragua, although a rule has been inferred from UN practice to the effect that an objection as to the legitimacy of a given ruling should be raised immediately after having had notice of such a ruling for it to bear legal effects. 85 In this case, however, the right of veto of the United States was even recognized expressly by the Representative of Ghana, one of the six co-sponsors of the draft resolution in point:
The Council has just failed to take a decision on a landmark case. This failure has been made possible by the use of the veto by a permanent member of the Council. That course of action is within the competence of the Council and legitimate, and we respect the decision so made. Conforti, supra note 78, at 292 et seq. 86 S/PV. 2718, at 53. It is as well to note that the objection to the ruling at hand made by Nicaragua during the same debate in the Council was expressed in rather vague terms from a legal viewpoint (ibid., at 57). It was only in the General Assembly, a week later, that a more legally orientated objection was advanced in the terms above described (supra note 54).
Be that as it may, one could not consider this precedent to be binding with respect to future cases of non-compliance with a Court decision, where the cases do not involve the use of force.
IV. The Nature of Measures Under Article 94 (2) The Charter provision in point provides that the Security Council may 'make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment' but does not refer to any specific kinds of measures. None of the three cases in which resort has been had to the Council under Article 94(2), namely, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., the Nicaragua and the Bosnia cases, offers useful insights into this matter. Here again, therefore, discussion must be based mainly on principle.
A tendency has emerged in scholarly writings to compare the scope of 'measures' under Article 94(2) with that of measures under Article 41.
87 However appropriate it would be to consider the authority of the Council to take, or decide, 'action' under Article 94(2) comparatively with that under Chapter VII, the above seems to be a moot question. This is so, if only because Article 41 provides a nonexhaustive list of coercive measures. Consequently, the Council could decide measures of the kind expressly listed in the latter provision, or even outside such a list, either under Article 94(2), or under Article 41 itself. As repeatedly indicated above, in principle, the characteristic feature of the enforcement action that the Council might take under Article 94(2) would not pertain so much to its content as to the fact that its legitimacy does not necessarily depend on the preconditions set out in Article 39. A case of non-compliance with a Court decision could be in itself a sufficient prerequisite. An assumption to the contrary, besides not finding support in the letter of the Charter, would entirely defeat the object and purpose of Article 94(2), rendering it totally superfluous.
In trying to consider which measures, among those within or outside the list of Article 41, could serve the purposes of Article 94(2), one should not lose sight of the fact that each case of non-compliance would be a special one. Nevertheless, some remarks of a general character would seem appropriate.
As to the suitability and the effectiveness of measures of the kind listed in Article 41 with respect to non-compliance with a Court decision, one should bear in mind that they were designed as a collective response to conducts that amount to threats to, or breaches of, the peace, or acts of aggression. Consequently, they may seem drastic and disproportionate. It is no wonder that, not only have they never been applied, they have not ever even been proposed. Among such measures, though, 'partial interruption of economic relations' might be appropriate, if applied in a very restrictive way; for example, an embargo on a limited number of categories of goods. Another kind of economic measure that would seem particularly appropriate to the issue at hand, not necessarily to be confined to cases of noncompliance with judicial awards of damages, 88 is the freezing of those assets belonging to the defaulting State that are to be found in the territory of the State which is the successful party, as well as in that of third States. The effectiveness of the enforcement function of such measures would certainly not depend on the economic disadvantage for the defaulting State. Such measures would increase public exposure of non-compliance by involving third States which would be bound under Articles 2(5), 25 and 49 to adopt the said measures. There is a fair chance that this would bring to bear pressure of a political and moral character on the defaulting State. At the same time however, there would be the risk that this attitude taken by the Council might lead to the counterproductive effect of prompting the defaulting State to hold on to its position for reasons of national pride.
A kind of action that may not be considered to involve a concrete type of coercive measure but that might, nevertheless, serve enforcement purposes, would be a Security Council resolution under Chapter VII reiterating the Court's pronouncement. By virtue of Article 25 such a resolution would extend -indirectly, and certainly not in technical terms -to all UN Member States the legal effects (or, at least, some of them) of the decision which, under Article 59 of the Court's Statute is binding only on the parties. This would be appropriate, not only to decisions calling for some affirmative step, or the cessation of wrongful conduct, but also declaratory judgments, particularly those declaring the wrongfulness or the invalidity of a given situation, which, at least implicitly, would require a duty of non-recognition. Such a course of action by the Security Council, aimed at legally involving all Member States with a case of non-compliance, would be especially appropriate when the Court has determined the existence of a serious breach of an international obligation erga omnes.* 9
Even if the present study is confined to the UN dimension of the question of the enforcement of judicial decisions, it is appropriate to mention the possibility that measures aimed at giving effect to decisions of the ICI could be taken by other There are other measures of a coercive nature that the Council could decide upon, or recommend under Article 94(2), individually or in conjunction with other Charter provisions, that have not been mentioned here, either because they are too drastic to be effective, or because the normative force of other Charter rules would be overriding with respect to the provision in point, or both. This would be the case of a recommendation by the Council to the General Assembly to suspend the persistently defaulting State 'from the exercise of the rights and privileges of [UN] membership' under Article 5.
90 It would also be the case of enforcement measures involving the use of force of the kind indicated in Article 42.
V. Article 94(2) and the Enforcement of Court Decisions which are not Judgments
As to the scope of application of the Charter provision at hand, a problem may arise, and has in fact already emerged, with regard to the fact that, whereas paragraph 1 of 90 'A Member of the United Nations against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The exercise of these rights and privileges may be restored by the Security Council'. It has been suggested, though, that it might be difficult to make a persuasive case that action under Article 94(2) can be defined as 'preventive or enforcement action' (Kerley, supra note 3). However, one could well make the case that, if the Council were to 'decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment' under Article 94(2), the difficulty would be to find any other way to describe the adoption of such measures but 'enforcement action'. The problem would rather concern the fact that measures such as suspension should be regarded as the last resort, but even as such, they would seem to stand little chance of having any persuasive effect on the defaulting party.
Article 94 provides for the compulsory character of 'decisions' of the International Court of Justice, in general, paragraph 2 of the same provision confers an enforcement competence upon the Council with reference to 'judgments'. On the basic question of whether the choice of the term 'judgment' was purposely used, as opposed to the term 'decision', with a view to avoiding giving the Council the authority to enforce all types of pronouncements other than final judgments that can be made by the Court, no help can be found in the preparatory works of the Charter. Some indications may be inferred from practice as well as from discussion on principle.
A. Orders Indicating Provisional, Measures. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case and the Bosnia Case
As a matter of fact, of the three cases in which Article 94(2) has been invoked, two refer to orders of the Court indicating provisional measures, namely the AngloIranian Oil Co. case of 1951 and the Bosnia case of 1993. In the former case the problem at hand was expressly discussed in the Council, 91 but no conclusive solution can be derived from the debate. The representative of the UK, which had resorted to the Council under Article 94(2), as well as Article 35, argued that the Council was competent to deal with a problem of enforcement of a Court order on the basis of both Article 94(2) of the Charter and Article 41(2) of the Statute, 92 the latter provision stating that the Court has to give notice to the Council of any provisional measures it has taken to preserve the rights of the parties. 93 He further expanded upon this point by arguing that the Council derived its authority to give effect to a Court order indicating provisional measures from the fact that the latter had no less binding force than the final decision. Such a consideration was built upon the a contrariis assumption that the binding force of the final judgment would be frustrated if the interim measures aimed at preserving its efficacy were not legally binding. The representative of the United Kingdom eventually weakened the strength of his argument, from a legal point of view, by stating that, irrespective of its legally-binding force, the Court's Order was 'an expression of opinion by the highest international judicial tribunal' of what was considered to be necessary to preserve the rights of the parties pending the final decision; he consequently inferred from this a 'strong moral obligation' on every Member of the United Nations to conform thereto. enforcement authority only with respect to a Court decision which is final and binding. He also countered, more specifically, the arguments put forward by the representative of the United Kingdom. As to the assumption by implication that a provisional order derived a legally-binding force from the fact that, otherwise, the binding character of the very final decision would be prejudiced if its effect could be frustrated in advance by ignoring the provisional measures, the representative of Iran maintained that this could well beade legeferenda argument, but that it did not reflect the existing law. As to the argument based on Article 41(2) of the Statute, he denied that the obligation for the Court to notify the Council of the provisional measures taken could provide the legal basis for the competence of the Council to take enforcement measures to give effect to the order indicating such measures, since the notification provision had merely a function of information. Also the representative of Equador strongly objected to considering the scope of application of Article 94(2) as encompassing Court orders indicating provisional measures, so much so, that he stated that his delegation could not vote in favour of a revised draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom 95 for the simple reason that it seemed to admit by implication that the Council had the competence to take action under Article 94(2), despite the fact that the Court had merely ordered provisional measures. It is to be noted that the language of the revised draft resolution in point did not request Iran to comply with the said order, as it did in the original draft, but called for ... [t] he resumption of negotiations at the earliest practicable moment in order to make further efforts to resolve the differences between the parties in accordance with the principles of the provisional measures indicated by the International Court of Justice unless mutually agreeable arrangements are made consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations Charter [...].96
As already indicated, 97 the Council decided to adjourn the debate until the Court had handed down the judgment on its jurisdiction and the matter was never brought up again, after the Court concluded that it had no jurisdiction in the case.
As stressed by Schachter, this case threw little light on the question at hand as '... [i] The letter from the Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 16 April 1993, can be taken as a strong element in favour of die assumption that Article 94(2) applies to provisional orders. Though, by requesting the Council to 'take immediate measures under Chapter VII to stop die assault and to enforce the Order of the International Court of Justice' the letter may lend support to die view that Article 94(2) does not provide an independent source of action for die Council. Nevertheless, such a reference to Chapter VII, it is submitted, was not made with regard to the legal basis of the Council's authority in the matter, but in order to indicate the coercive nature of the action requested. One should also remember that the facts complained of in die letter in point were part and parcel of a situation that patently involved the use of force and that, already at diat time, had been many times before the Council which had dealt with the issue repeatedly, mainly by exercising coercive authority under Chapter VII.
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On the other hand, Security Council Resolution 819 did not contain any reference to Article 94(2). The case could be made that this was just because the Court pronouncement was contained in an order and not in a final judgment. In Problems of Enforcement of Decisions of the ICJ and the Law of the United Nations supporting the opposite view, one could maintain, in the first place, that express reference in a resolution to its legal basis is not a requirement and, as a matter of practice, such a reference has not always been made by the Council. Furthermore, this alleged shortcoming could be considered compensated by the fact that in the preamble of the resolution at hand, the Council took extensive note of the Order of the Court of 8 April 1993. It is true that, in the last preambular paragraph of Resolution 819, the Council indicated that it was 'acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations', also in accordance with the request by the Bosnian Government. Such a reference, however, does not appear to pertain to the legal basis of the competence of the Council in the matter, but seems intended to determine the enforcement nature of its action. Besides, this was further sufficiently qualified by the Council to indicate that the resolution in point was to be considered as aimed at supplementing the coercive course of action already undertaken under Chapter VII. The paragraph in point read as follows: 'Recalling the provisions of resolution 815 (1993) 102 The resolution in point also reaffirmed 'that any taking or acquisition of territory by the threat or use of force, including the practice of 'ethnic cleansing', is unlawful and unacceptable '. 103 Basically, one can safely say that the Council, with Resolution 819, decided on measures that, with the reservation that its language omits the word 'genocide', can well be considered as measures aimed at giving effect to the provisional measures indicated by the International Court of Justice in its Order of 8 April 1993. The fact is that it could just as well have done so irrespective of Article 94(2).
Both the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case and the Bosnia case show that, under Article 94(2), Members of the United Nations have brought before the Council situations of non-compliance with orders of the Court indicating provisional measures, and that, irrespective of the position on the competence of the Council to take action in these cases under the Charter provision at hand, no objection was legally-binding force of the final judgment itself would be prejudiced if one of the parties could frustrate it in advance by engaging in conduct at variance with an order indicating interim measures. As clearly stated by Fitzmaurice:
The whole logic of the jurisdiction to indicate interim measures entails that, when indicated, they are binding -for this jurisdiction is based on the absolute necessity, when the circumstances call for it, of being able to preserve, and to avoid prejudice to, the rights of the parties, as determined by the final judgment of the court.
• 10 It is to be noted how this passage was carefully drafted to counter those textual interpretations of Article 41 of the Statute of the Court which, in order to substantiate the non-binding character of interim measures, stress that the said provision uses the verb 'to indicate', rather than 'to order' or 'to prescribe'. One can only agree on the importance of drawing attention to the fact that according to Article 41 the Court may indicate provisional measures when it 'considers that circumstances so require'.
111 Another argument, grounded outside the normative framework of the Charter, in support of the binding character of interim measures, and, especially, that Court orders indicating such measures are suitable for enforcement action, should be inferred from the contention that the power to indicate interim measures in international law amounts to a general principle of law reflecting the procedural law of a great number of national legal systems. 112 In fact, where contemplated at the domestic level, such measures, are immediately enforceable.
Even though, from a strictly theoretical point of view, there might still be doubts as to the appropriateness of considering orders of the Court indicating provisional measures to be on the same footing as its final judgments, it seems that it would be only in hne with the general powers of the Security Council to maintain that it is vested with the authority to 'make recommendations or decide upon measures to give effect to [orders indicating provisional measures]'. However, even if one were to deny that such a conclusion could be reached through a textual interpretation of 
VI. Concluding Remarks
It appears from the above analysis that the only way to interpret Article 94(2) in such a way that, in strictly legal terms, might confer an independent normative function to this provision and, thus, a reason for it to have been inserted in the Charter is to consider it as the legal basis for the Council to take enforcement action of the kind set forth in Chapter VII, irrespective of die preconditions provided for in Article 39, i.e., 'the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression'. Nevertheless, this contention remains of only theoretical importance, so long as the Council keeps interpreting the preconditions for its coercive action set out in Article 39 as extensively as possible, so as to consider even cases of noncompliance with a Court decision mat may not involve the use of force as a threat to the peace. For the rest, Article 94(2) only reiterates, widi special regard to cases of non-compliance with Court decisions, other Charter provisions of a more general character: (a) Articles 35(1) and 37(1), that give any Member State a locus standi before the Council with regard to Chapter VI like situations; (b) Articles 36 and 37(2), diat confer the Security Council the power to act motu proprio with respect to the same kind of situations; (c) Article 39. Even if, from a legalistic point of view, one can see little additional value in Article 94(2), and even if one were to consider the latter as devoid of almost any normative autonomy, it seems appropriate to have a provision in the Charter that singles out a locus standi before the Council for cases of non-compliance with a Court decision. Furthermore, in the light of relevant practice (though scarce) the Charter provision under consideration, proves to be perfectly in line with the main political underpinnings of the United Nations system. On the one hand, it is in keeping with those Charter provisions aimed at upholding the 'rule of law': the purpose of the peaceful settlement of disputes (Article 2(3) and Chapter VI) and the importance the Charter attaches for its pursuance to the International Court of Justice (Articles 7, 36(3), and 92), the binding character of its decisions (Article 94(1)) and the duty for all Members to 'fulfil in good faith die obligations assumed by them in accordance with the [...] Charter' (Article 2(2)). On the other hand, in conformity with the general rationale of the Charter, Article 94(2) combines the above principles with the needs of international politics. In order to meet such needs the Charter has avoided putting the Security Council under the judicial authority of the Court and has provided the Permanent Members of the Council with the right to veto any decision, or even recommendation, concerning 'action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression', especially so, if any of them was allegedly responsible for the existence of such a situation.
119 Accordingly, when the Council was asked to take action under Article 94(2) against one of its Permanent Members for non-compliance with a Court decision in a case involving the use of force it was blocked by the veto of the defaulting Permanent Member. However, this apparently negative result for the rule of law in the Nicaragua case, as well as the lack of action in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case, were reached through a policy decision-making process, which did not really impair the legal authority of the Court. In both cases, the Members of the Council who were against action to give effect to the judicial decision, presented their position by and large on mainly political grounds, without questioning the legal reasoning of the Court.
The case has been made in the present study that such an attitude of self-restraint could be sanctioned by a rule of conduct to be 'softly' codified, at least, in a resolution of the General Assembly. 120 This would have primarily symbolic meaning. At the same time, it would have the merit of reminding Member States of a rule of conduct which they, themselves, have applied spontaneously as a way to preserve in the matter at hand the delicate balance between law and politics which is essential for the functioning of the United Nations system.
The main consideration which might help in striking the correct balance between respect for legal values and satisfaction of political exigencies in this issue is one which holds true from both a legal and a political point of view. That is the separation between the dispute before the Court and the dispute concerning noncompliance with the Court's decision, the latter of which is to be dealt with by the Council. Obviously, while before the Court legal considerations necessarily prevail, when a case of non-compliance with a Court ruling comes to the Security Council, which is a body established and functioning under legal rules that have made it purportedly a political as opposed to a judicial organ, such a case becomes one of political relevance. This may justify the impression that the said balance gives prevalence to political factors.
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119 This apparently deplorable rule has permitted the Organization to go through almost forty years of crisis without the withdrawal of any major Member, therefore, keeping alive within the Organization what might be defined as a mix between a permanent negotiation for international peace and 'horse trading' in pursuance of national interests. 120 Supra, section II.A.3. 121 As it was recently maintained by Kennedy, 'it may be hoped that Court and Council will continue to complement each other, as required by the spirit of the UN Charter, and will remain cognisant of their respective roles and capabilities, each acknowledging the distinctive competence of the other for addressing particular kinds of disagreements in the international arena' (supra note 2).
